In Greece
the Church and State are two cultural entities with innumerable
inter-connecting historical links, all embedded in
the emotional DNA of Greeks no matter what their politics. That the
Greek Church and State have such a close working relationship when separation
of the two institutions is a western norm surprises and even shocks many
visitors to Greece. It seems anachronistic. That priests and prelates are in
fact paid state workers comes as even more of a shock.
Both modern
institutions were born as a result of the Greece’s victory in the War of
Independence but the roots of their relationship go much farther back -to the
Byzantine era when church and state, were perceived as two sides of the same
coin, a synergy that theoretically
at least worked to the benefit of both institutions. Such harmony
assumed religious homogeneity, mutual respect and, above all, common goals.
Synergy did not always work smoothly then and the attempt to emulate it (still
the Greek Church’s professed goal) in a modern western state has led to strange
situations.
A Short History
When the
revolution began, Greeks in what would become the new nation, like all Orthodox
under Ottoman rule, looked upon the Patriarch
in Constantinople as their leader and the Patriarch did not support the
struggle for a Greek state. He was responsible for the Greek Orthodox community
under the Ottoman millet system and
felt compelled to immediately repudiate the revolution and excommunicate its
leaders. He could hardly have acted otherwise; the Great Church in captivity
under the Ottomans had gained tremendous power over its flock while at the same
time was constantly in fear of the absolute power of the Porte. And its
headquarters were in the Ottoman capital.
But in the areas
of what is now Greece and where the fighting was taking place, the local clergy
felt differently. They were experiencing the humiliations and taxations imposed
on their Orthodox congregations first hand. For them the battle was for
Christendom against the infidels, freedom against oppression. Many priests
joined the rebels in 1821, including Germanos the bishop of Patras who famously (perhaps
apocryphally) raised the Greek flag in
Kalavrita against the Ottomans. In the Peloponnese, where priests numbered 2400,
they made a significant difference. The Sultan for his part showed bad faith
immediately by brutally hanging the Patriarch and as many of his bishops as he
could find. After that no cleric could assume the Turks would trust an avowed
allegiance in any case. The die was cast. Monasteries, and there were many, joined
the fight. They harboured revolutionaries, ransacked their libraries for cardboard
to make cartridge cases, - and came out fighting.
When victory was
certain, it was at first unclear what
role the church would have in the emerging nation. There were vast
differences among those who had fought, especially among the indigenous foot
soldiers and the idealists who would create the new constitution. The Greek
intellectuals who had masterminded the revolution and garnered foreign support
had views which were western, elitist, imbued with nineteenth century
nationalistic idealism and yet, at the same time looked back, not just to
Byzantium, but to ancient Greece as well for models.
These men had
expressed negative views of the local population and clergy even before the revolution started. In 1788 Adamantios
Korais famously remarked:
Instead of Miltiades or Themistocles whom
Europe still admires, we are governed by scoundrels and stupid men as well as
by an ignorant clergy who are even worse than our foreign tyrants the Turks.
That the new nation
needed an identity was apparent and they were prepared to forge one. All agreed, as most Greeks perhaps would today,
that Orthodoxy along with the Greek language
would be the twin pillars of this new identity but both were considered to
be in serious need of ‘civilizing”. Demotic,
the language as spoken by the people in the early 19th century was regarded
as a debased and barbaric dialect. Henceforth Katharevousa (literally, a pure
version) of Greek was to be developed for all legal and Governmental
communications. That the average new citizen would not understand it was not
considered important. With that decided, the
exact nature of the church’s relationship to the new state had to be defined.
Separating the Orthodox
clergy from the control of the Patriarch was the only practical option open at
the time; it would hardly do to have the head of the new nation’s church in
enemy territory. Separation of the church and the new state was not even
considered. The plan which evolved was to have a national church independent of the Patriarchate and, but at the
same time, to create a church
organization that would be subservient to the state. In 1821, Orthodoxy
was declared to be the official religion
of the country and at the same
time a governmental Ministry of Religion was formed which promptly
stripped local bishops of the judicial power that had been theirs under the millet
system of the Ottoman Empire. Capodistria,
the first president of Greece (1827) and an autocrat by nature, took the next
step by personally naming bishops to
empty sees caused by the war. It was practical, but hardly canonical. In 1828, when
the then Patriarch sent a delegation from Constantinople to protest; it was
sent packing.
Capodistria was
assassinated in 1831, and Greece became a monarchy under King Otto, the 17 year
old son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. Chosen by the big powers because he was the
most innocuous candidate, he arrived in 1833.
In the same year the Greek Church was officially
declared autocephalous, separate from the Patriarch in all but dogma. It
was given its own permanent five member Synod with the young king as its head, no matter that he was a Roman
Catholic. The king would choose any new bishops. (In 1843 the new constitution
would state that any future king had to be Orthodox, at least making his choice
of bishops a tad more logical) The governmental Ministry of Education and Religion was retained and has remained to
this day. But a new office was formed as well. Henceforth, a procurator representing the government would
be present and would have to approve all Synodal
decisions. The intention of government to control church affairs could hardly
be clearer. To make that easier, the number of bishoprics in the new kingdom
was reduced to 10 requiring a double, triple and quadrupling up of existing
bishops and no one bishop was to be
supreme. The Church was to retain jurisdiction over marriage and divorce
only, and was told to stay out of politics both internal and external.
Using the new Synod
as its instrument, the government turned
its attention to church property. The Church was (and is) a big landowner
both through inheritances and former Imperial largesse. All monasteries with
less than 6 monks were closed down and the money acquired either from sales or
rents was to be turned over to a special Ecclesiastic Fund which would be used for
the church and for the development of a new public school system. 418 monasteries were closed, leaving 148
still open for the 2,000 monks in the kingdom; nunneries were reduced to three.
This explains many of the picturesque moldering ruins of Byzantine churches in
the Mani and many other areas in Greece.
Given the financial poverty of the new state, it is hard to see how any
other course of action would have been possible.
At the prompting
of the church, proselytism on the part
of any other religion was forbidden although toleration was professed. This
law is still in force today. The church may have become a subordinate entity in
the new state but as a pillar of the ethnos
it was a privileged and protected one.
Meanwhile, the problem of Episcopal succession became
acute. There had been no official communication between the Patriarchate
and Greek clergy since 1821 and only the
patriarch could produce Chrisma, the special oil needed to consecrate bishops. As time passed and bishops died, the
Greek government saw the wisdom of repairing the breach with the Patriarch. It
was not merely a question of finding some other way to anoint bishops. There
was a political aspect as well, - a fear of the growing influence of Russia on
Orthodoxy if the new state was permanently out of the Patriarchal family. Remember
that most Greek speaking Orthodox citizens were still inside the borders of the
crumbling Ottoman Empire. The new nation was tiny, comprising only the
Peloponnese and the part of the mainland south of modern day Volos. Also the Greek Church needed canonical legitimacy
and just possibly may have wanted to loosen the bear hug of its own government by
restoring this important tie. Negotiations followed. In 1852 the patriarch agreed to recognize the Greek Church as autocephalous in
the Orthodox community, and just in time. There were only 8 bishops in all of Greece. In the same year, the number of episcopal sees
in Greece was upped to 24 and the church got a super bishop- a Metropolitan – the bishop of Athens (now an Archbishop)
to lead a rotating synod.
The
procurator remained in office, and the king still chose bishops but now from a
list of three given to him by the Synod. Appointments
within the church were still part of politics and the church hierarchy would
spend an inordinate amount of time courting politicians who could further their
episcopal ambitions.
As time passed, territories
were added to the Greek state; the Greek Church grew along with the nation. It
was hoped that the Greek state and church would continue to expand until
Constantinople and the Patriarchate were once again Greek territory. This goal,
called the Megali (Great) Idea, was wholeheartedly supported by both church and
state. The beau ideal of Byzantium was alluring and always present. The dream of
replacing the old Byzantine Empire with the new nation state in expanded form
caused both church and state to participate in the creation and perpetuation of
a national myth that would sustain
this vision. Any past Orthodox accommodation with the Ottomans got written out
of popular history and the church became the shining symbol of unequivocal
resistance to Ottoman rule. The Megali Idea has never been realized, but it
resulted in a Conservative and backward looking Church whose goals were tied to
the nationalistic aspirations and prejudices of the emerging state, - and their
mutual attraction to Byzantium. It made a forward looking church less
likely.
In 1901 Queen Olga, something of a reformer, supervised with
Pallis - a noted author- an authoritative translation
of the New Testament into demotic Greek, the everyday language of the
people. Conservatives were outraged and argued that it was blasphemous. Enraged
students took over the university on Nov 8th, 1901, and a protest was held at
the columns of Olympian Zeus, of all places. A riot ensued which left 8 dead
and 100 wounded. In the aftermath, the Holy
Synod of the Greek Church forbade the translation. This 1901 riot somehow encapsulates a
great deal of church-state politics and Greek life in general. Some of the
worst riots and protests in Greece are not about creating change, but about
preserving the perceived status quo. Even today the text of the Bible is protected by the Greek Constitution and
cannot be translated without prior approval of the Orthodox Church of Greece. Furthermore,
the Greek Church still uses only the original Greek Bible, written in koine, the contemporary idiom of the
apostles, in its liturgy.
All
Clergy become Civil Servants
In 1909,
legislation, which before had dealt only with Bishop’s pay, was passed granting
subsidies from the general Ecclesiastical fund to the much ignored and
impoverished parish clergy. It wasn’t generous and priests still had to eke out
a living from weddings, baptisms and funerals, but it would serve to bind the
priests more closely to the government, their paymaster(1).
The possibilities of this system creating, well, a civil service mentality
inside the church, not to mention the potential for connivance between church
and state officials would need an extremely balanced not to say ethical concept
of synergy to make sure the church did not simply become another state
institution involved in every dispute not just between political parties but between
politicians and the Royal house, an
institution which had considerable political power in its own right and was often at odds with its ministers. One bizarre
incident in 1916 illustrates the point.
Prime
minister, Venizelos, did not see eye to eye with the king and formed a separate
government in Thessaloniki. The Church supported the king to a breathtaking
degree. They excommunicated Venizelos thus
making this governmental crisis a matter
of heresy and salvation. Clerics added insult to injury by parading a
decapitated bull’s head (in lieu of the prime minister) through the streets of
Athens and ceremonially stoning it in a public park.
I first saw this in the Benaki museum. My photos were too reflective. I got this one by googling: anathema venizelos on the site athriskos.gr
When he regained
control in 1917, Venizelos returned the favour by ousting the Archbishop and
most of the Synod. Recriminations of this
sort became all too common. By 1923 the church had become so entangled
in the politics of the day that the then Archbishop asked the state to reform
the Synod because it had become a mere tool of political factions.
The new
proposal was that the highest level of ecclesiastical administration be given
to all diocesan bishops who would
meet yearly. In 1931 the Church got
yet another new constitution. It
gave authority back to the general synod of bishops which would meet every
three years unless a special need developed. A small permanent Holy Synod of nine (whose
members would rotate annually), with the Archbishop presiding, would administer church business. The procurator lost his vote but all recommendations
of the Synod still had to be approved by the Ministry.
These small
steps towards democratization and independence did not disentangle the church
from politics. When the dictator Metaxas
took over in 1936, he supported the church, as dictators tend to do, by making
sure that non Orthodox religions were even more proscribed. All of their places
of worship had to be licensed by the state (still a law in Greece) In return
the church supported him. The war intervened and by the end of it, the king was
in temporary exile, and the Greek political scene in such tatters, that the
church was, for a time, the only institution able to rally or represent the
nation. The civil war made the situation even more horrible. It is a grim
statistic, that while 125 priests were killed by the Germans, 239 priests were
killed by the communists during the civil war. When democracy returned, the church’s dislike of godless
communists was to make it more conservative than ever and to tie it to the
political right.
In 1967, another dictator, this time Papadopoulos, took over. He immediately dismissed the Holy Synod and
put in his own man as Archbishop. The church, on the whole, was silent. When
the king attempted to oust the Junta and was forced into exile, the church did
not protest. Papadopoulos promised a new and gaudy cathedral for Orthodoxy that
never happened and proposed putting priests on the same pay scale as civil
servants, which he did. He also proposed
yet another new Church Constitution in 1969 which gave the church just a little
more freedom than before. When the junta’s
rule ended in 1975, his constitution remained in place, as did the junta’s appointed
archbishop.
1974 and On
A new
government led by Karamanlis took power in 1974,
and change was in the air. A referendum put paid to Greece’s monarchy and the
new constitution stated that Orthodoxy was the
established religion of
Greece (epikratousa), no longer the official one (nomokratousa),
– a small change practically since other
religions were still impeded and the anti proselytism law is still on the books,
but it perhaps points a way into the future.
Greece’s entry into the common market has added yet another dimension to the church-state debate. The Church has to contend with more liberal European view of such matters. But the church has not given ground easily. When the government, in line with EU regulations, decided to remove religious affiliation from Identity Cards in 2000, the church mobilized an impressive popular resistance that went on for a long time and it was true that filling in that particular blank with any denomination other than Orthodox or even leaving it blank often put the holder of that card at a real disadvantage. The advent of civil marriage in 1982 came only after a great deal of incivility – the Church was dead against it.
Greece’s entry into the common market has added yet another dimension to the church-state debate. The Church has to contend with more liberal European view of such matters. But the church has not given ground easily. When the government, in line with EU regulations, decided to remove religious affiliation from Identity Cards in 2000, the church mobilized an impressive popular resistance that went on for a long time and it was true that filling in that particular blank with any denomination other than Orthodox or even leaving it blank often put the holder of that card at a real disadvantage. The advent of civil marriage in 1982 came only after a great deal of incivility – the Church was dead against it.
The national
myth equating Orthodoxy with Greekness in the twenty first century is a double
edged sword especially as immigration begins to change the demographics of the
nation and other religious groups form larger minorities. Orthodox priests still
preside exclusively at the opening of parliament and Orthodoxy is taught in
schools. The situation in Thrace where there is a large Greek Moslem population
is different. Imams are paid by the state there (fair is fair). But Athens still has not built a mosque for its
growing Moslem population although it is being discussed, and any Islamic
Greek citizen dying in Athens would have to seek burial in Thrace. Greece still
has a Ministry of Education and
Religious Affairs which involves itself intimately with church matters both
internal and external
Today’s
socialists talk a lot of separating the church and state, but the mainstream
left do not propose it with any real passion (2)
. Nor does the church seem eager to slough off its state ties. When offered
in the 1980s the chance to gain more economic independence and pay the clergy
directly, the Church said ‘no’. The political
far right, on the other hand, purports to champion the church, an alliance that
must engender concern among the thinking clergy. The
rise of the nationalistic Golden Dawn Party which claims Orthodoxy as its own
and part of their crazy Greek racial idea has drawn vehement protests from
individual bishops but disappointingly maybe not enough condemnation from the
Greek church as a whole (3).
That is the situation today and
how one feels about it depends very much on one’s perspective. In spite of an
increasing number of young people either not interested in the church or who see
it as too conservative, and the current economic crisis, the complex double helix called church and state seems destined to
carry on indefinitely - unless some new
Alexander comes along and severs the Gordian knot in unpredictable ways.
Footnotes
(1)To be fair it must be pointed out that the original
agreement of the government to pay bishops was a result of the government’s
annexation of so much church property in 1833. It was to be a recompense, and
still is, for property taken since. See www.Ecclesia.gr the Churches official website:
Letter of the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece Ieronimos, regarding the
issues of taxation of the Orthodox Church of Greece and of the payroll of its
clergy to Greek PM and the leaders of the EU. This was on the website in May
13, 2013 under “Archbishop Letter” “Regarding Church taxation”
Pay Scale per month of Clergy as published in the International Herald Tribune of Sep
8, 2012:
A newly appointed priest: 770 euro net (1,092 pre
tax)
Clerics with ten years experience: 1032 net
(1,383 pre tax)
Metropolitan bishop with 30 years experience 1,750
net (2,453 pre tax)
Archbishop Ieronymous receives 2,213 euros net (2,978
pre tax)
(2) The communist party has always been anti-clerical and today’s Syriza is also, to quite a degree, but
Church-State relationships are never a priority during election campaigns.
Probably because the issue is not a sure winner by any means.
(3)
In ekathimerini.com , Tuesday
October 30, 2012 (19:56) ,
Achbishop Ieronymos said: “The Church loves all people, including
those who are black, white or non-Christians,. Secondly the Church has its path
to follow and does not need anyone to
protect it.” The very liberality and freedom of individual bishops makes it
difficult for the archbishop. Some bishops have come out against Golden dawn,
while others have offered support in one degree or other. See also GRreporter, 31 October 2012: Sacred
dispute about Golden Dawn
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